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Abstract
We develop the testable implications of well-known theories of bargaining over money.
Given a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, where utility functions are unknown, we
ask if a given theory could have generated the observations. When the data come with
a fixed disagreement point, we show that the Nash, utilitarian, and the egalitarian max-
min bargaining solutions are all observationally equivalent. These theories are in turn
characterized by a simple test of comonotonicity of bargaining outcomes.
When the disagreement point is allowed to vary, we characterize the testable implica-
tions of the equal gain/loss egalitarian solution. The main application of our result is to
testing the tax code for compliance with the principle of equal loss. For other theories, we
introduce a general method based on the study of real solutions to systems of polynomial
inequalities.
JEL classification numbers: C71,C78
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the testable implications of theories of fair
allocation. We have in mind the allocation of a single-dimensional resource: we can
essentially focus on the allocation of money amongst a set of agents. We suppose that we
have available certain data on how money was divided amongst a fixed number of agents,
but have no such data on agents’ preferences and the method or protocol that lead to
the division. We want to know when observed allocations are consistent with standard
bargaining theory.
There are several well-known theories that could explain a given division of money.
One might imagine that the resource is divided in a way to maximize a sum of utilities,
what we term the utilitarian model. One might instead assume that the resource is
divided according to a process of Nash bargaining, what we call the Nash model (after
Nash (1950)). Finally, the classical egalitarian paradigm of maximizing the utility of
the worst off agents leads to what we call the maxmin model. Our goal here is to ask
whether such theories place any testable restrictions on observable data.
Each of these three theories is commonly assumed in economic applications. Probably
the most common is the utilitarian model. Aside from the simplicity of working with
sums, the motivation is that in a model where utility can be transferred (but transfers
might not be observed), there are transfers for which an allocation (x1, ..., xn) Pareto
dominates (y1, ..., yn) if and only if
∑n
i=1 ui(xi) ≥
∑n
i=1 ui(yi).
The Nash solution is also used in applied modeling, from macroeconomics to contract
theory and applied mechanism design. Assuming identical linear utilities over wealth, the
Nash solution is simply the recommendation to split surpluses equally. In fact, while this
solution is often justified by Nash’s argument, essentially any symmetric social welfare
function would make the same recommendation. For example, framing the example as
a transferable utility game (which is possible by linearity of utility), Shapley’s value
recommends the same solution.
Finally, the maxmin approach, commonly identified with Rawls (1999), finds less
application, but is a favorite topic of study for welfare theorists. And Young (1988) has
suggested that many methods of taxation are based on a kind of maxmin principle.
We have three main results.
Firstly (Section 2), data comes in the form of observed income shares only. If negoti-
ations break down, the disagreement outcome for all individuals is known to be zero. We
observe a finite collection of data points. For example, these might be the outcome of
union wage bargaining, bankruptcy liquidation proceedings, or government subsidies. We
investigate the restrictions that each of the three models, utilitarian, Nash, and maxmin,
place on the allocations of shares. We want to test the hypotheses that shares are allo-
cated according to these theories when utility functions are assumed to be concave, but
otherwise can differ across individuals.
We discover that the empirical content of the three models is identical. No data set
will ever allow us to distinguish between them. A dataset either refutes all three or is
consistent with all three. Furthermore, the theories have very weak predictive power.
The only empirical prediction of any of these theories is that data should be perfectly or-
dinally correlated, or comonotonic. This means that if one individual’s share rises across
data points, so must all individuals’. The only refutations of the models are observations
in which one individual’s income share rises while another’s falls. Comonotonicity, some-
times called “resource monotonicity,” is such a basic principle of distributive justice in
the single-dimensional commodity model, that there are essentially no normative theories
violating it.
In second place, in Section 3 we turn to data in which the disagreement point can
vary (yet remains observable). We focus on the classical model of equal gains or equal
losses–essentially the maxmin model discussed above. Here, we imagine that there is
some utility function, common to all individuals, and that division of money is chosen
to equalize gains in utility from the individual endowments. Our results are a direct
application of the Theorem of the Alternative, and as a consequence our test is easily
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operationalized using linear programming methods.
A standard application of this model is to taxation–the “disagreement” point is the
vector of ex-post incomes, while the observed shares are ex-ante incomes. Our theory is
then a classical egalitarian method of taxation (Young, 1988): the theory of equal loss
due to taxation. When utility over money is concave, one may expect poor agents to be
taxed less than rich agents. We present a test of this theory in the case when utility is
concave but unknown. Young (1990) studies the same problem, but using a parametric
estimation approach to find the best-fitting utility index to tax data in the United States.
The results of this section have an interesting byproduct–the testable implications of
Hotelling’s model of spatial competition (Hotelling, 1929). Subsection 3.1 demonstrates
how this problem is a special case of the environment studied in section 3.
In third place, we analyze other models under data with a variable disagreement
point. The equal gains/losses model is simple to analyze with a variable disagreement
point, but other theories, such as the Nash theory, or even a utilitarian theory, are much
more difficult. Data were consistent with the equal losses model if and only if they
satisfied a system of linear inequalities–this is where our application of the Theorem of
the Alternative comes in. By contrast, data are consistent with the Nash model if and
only if they satisfy a system of polynomial inequalities. The Theorem of the Alternative
no longer applies in this case. To this end, we describe a result which has been recently
popular in the mathematics literature–the Positivstellensatz. The Positivstellenstz is
a kind of Theorem of the Alternative for polynomial inequalities. For any system of
polynomial inequalities, that system is infeasible if and only if some dual system is
feasible. Practically speaking, the dual system has polynomials as its own variables, and
hence, can be quite difficult to apply. On the other hand, recent numerical advances based
on techniques of Parrilo (2003) often allow such infeasibility certificates to be obtained.
These results apply semidefinite programming (Vandenberghe and Boyd, 1996) to the
problem of determining whether a given polynomial is a sum of squares.
The Positivstellensatz technique can be compared with the Tarski-Seidenberg elimi-
nation procedure, first studied in the economics literature by Brown and Matzkin (1996).
Tarski-Seidenberg provides an algorithm that one can perform on finite systems of poly-
nomial inequalities in order to determine whether or not those inequalities are consistent
(that is, the theory of the reals is decidable).
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1.1 Related literature
The recent contribution of Chiappori, Donni, and Komunjer (2010) investigates the em-
pirical content of Nash bargaining. There are several important differences between that
work and ours. The main difference is that their framework assumes disagreement points
are unobserved. Instead, they suppose that some vector of underlying, observable Eu-
clidean characteristics uniquely determine both the utility functions of agents, as well as
the disagreement point. Without assuming any kind of structure on the joint dependence
of disagreement point and utility on these underlying characteristics, their model obvi-
ously has no testable implications (this is their Proposition 2). To have any empirical
content, they must assume some structure on the dependence of the utility function and
disagreement point on these characteristics. They assume that this dependence is known
to satisfy certain properties (differentiability and “exclusion restrictions”) both within
and across characteristics. By contrast, in our model, disagreement point observations
are part of the observed data, and this leads to the falsifiability of the model.
The other main distinction between their work and ours is that they are concerned
with understanding the testable implications of the model in a continuous sense–the
implications of the model if we could observe the division across all possible problems.
Our work, on the other hand, assumes only that a finite number of possible division
problems are observed (with their solutions). The distinction in the two approaches
can be best understood by considering the classical demand model: their approach is
analogous to characterizing rationalizability by conditions on the Slutsky matrix; while
our approach is analogous to Afriat’s (Afriat, 1967) discussion of finite data sets which
are rationalizable.
Earlier works discussing the empirical content of Nash bargaining, usually assuming
all individuals are identical and risk neutral, include Hamermesh (1973) and Bowlby and
Schriver (1978). Svejnar (1980) provides a critique of these ideas.
As earlier noted, Young (1990) constructs a test of the maxmin hypothesis, using
empirical data on US income taxes from 1957-1987. His approach is estimation-based,
and he finds that tax data are reasonably close to predicted data from the maxmin model
in most years (there are exceptions). He assumes specific parametric forms for the utility
function. By contrast, we provide an exact test of the maxmin model, assuming no
parametric functional form. Young (1988) provides a kind of exact empirical test of the
maxmin model, assuming the solution to all possible problems is observed, and further
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assuming observations across different populations.
2 A single test for all theories
In this section, we consider an environment for which d = 0 throughout; that is, the
disagreement point is fixed and symmetric. Our aim will be to understand the testable
implications of three different social choice models when utility indices can be different,
but are required to be strictly concave and strictly increasing. We establish that the
only principle of justice that can be tested when preferences are allowed to differ across
individuals is a basic solidarity principle. And the principle is extremely weak: it solely
requires that if one agent’s consumption increases, then so does the consumption of all
remaining agents (it says nothing about how much). The punchline is twofold. First,
these three models have identical testable implications. Thus, among the three most
popular models of social welfare, we would have no way of identifying which one is being
used based on data alone. Second, the empirical predictions of these models are very
weak. It is hard to think of any kind of environment where this principle would ever
be refuted, or any justifiable normative reason for violating the principle. The principle
that all agents should share in marginal gains is so basic it can hardly even be called a
fairness principle.
The available data takes the following form. We have K observations, each one
describing an allocation x = (x1, . . . , xN) of an aggregate monetary quantity
∑N
i=1 xi.
We assume that the disagreement point is normalized to 0, so all observations here are of
strictly positive quantities.1 A data set then takes the form {(xk)}Kk=1, where xk ∈ RN++.
There are three basic models to consider: first, the utilitarian model. Data {(xk)}Kk=1
are utilitarian rationalizable if there exist strictly monotonic and strictly concave
ui for which
∑
i∈N ui(x
k
i ) ≥
∑
i∈N ui(yi) for all allocations (y1, . . . , yN) with
∑
i yi =∑
i x
k
i . Data {(xk)}Kk=1 are Nash rationalizable if there exist strictly monotonic and
strictly concave ui, normalized so that ui(0) = 0, for which
∏
i ui(x
k
i ) ≥
∏
i ui(yi) for
all
∑
i yi =
∑
i x
k
i . Finally, data {(xk)}Kk=1 are maxmin rationalizable if there exist
strictly monotonic and strictly concave ui, normalized so that ui(0) = 0, for which
mini∈N ui(xki ) ≥ mini∈N ui(yi) for all
∑
i yi =
∑
i x
k
i .
1Importantly, the disagreement point must be the same for all observations. This assumption can be
interpreted in two ways. First, we can suppose that the disagreement point is observed, and normalize
the data accordingly. Second, we can suppose that the disagreement point is unobserved but fixed.
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Note that data are Nash rationalizable if and only if there exist ui strictly concave
and positive for which
∑
i log(ui(x
k
i )) ≥
∑
i log(ui(yi)) for all
∑
i yi =
∑
i x
k
i .
Finally, say that the data {xk}Kk=1 are comonotonic if for all i, j ∈ N and all k, l,
xki < x
l
i implies x
k
j < x
l
j. Comonotonicity requires that outcomes are perfectly ordinally
correlated.
Theorem 1. Given data {xk}Kk=1, the following are equivalent.
1. The data are comonotonic.
2. The data are utilitarian rationalizable.
3. The data are Nash rationalizable.
4. The data are maxmin rationalizable.
Proof. It is easy to see that if the data are either utilitarian or Nash rationalizable, then
they must be comonotonic. This follows as in each case, the data solve a basic concave
optimization problem.
Step 1: The data are comonotonic imply the data are utilitarian rational-
izable.
Suppose that the data are comonotonic. We claim that there exist ui strictly concave,
strictly increasing, satisfying ui(0) = 0, and for which for all k ∈ {1, ..., K},
∑
i ui(x
k
i ) ≥∑
i ui(yi) for all
∑
i yi =
∑
i x
k
i . In fact, we show that we can take ui to be twice
continuously differentiable.
Consider the following claim:
Claim 2. Given a finite collection of positive real numbers {x1, ..., xK} ⊆ R++, where
xk < xk+1 for all k, there is a smooth, decreasing, function f > 0 such that f(x
k) = 1/k,
k = 1, . . . , K.
Step 1 follows from the claim in the following way. By comonotonicity, we may
without loss of generality assume the data are ordered so that k < l implies that xki < x
l
i
for all i.2 Then let fi be the constructed function in Claim (2) for the set {x1i , ..., xKi }.
2By comonotonicity, it is without loss of generality to assume that k 6= l implies xki 6= xli.
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Let ui(x) =
∫ x
0
fi(s)ds. Since fi is strictly positive and decreasing, ui has the desired
properties. On the other hand, for each k,
∂
∑N
i=1 ui(yi)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣∣
(y1,...,yN )=(x
k
1 ,...,x
k
N )
= fi(x
k
i ) = 1/k.
Then the first-order conditions for maximization of
∑N
i=1 ui(yi) are satisfied at x
k, and
thus the functions ui rationalize the data.
To prove Step 1, let zk = x
k+xk+1
2
, k = 1, . . . , K − 1. Let a1, b1 > 0 be the solution to
the equation a1 − b1x1 = 1 and a1 − b1z1 = (1 + (1/2))(1/2).
Let ak, bk > 0 be the solution to the equation ak − bkxk = 1/k and ak − bkzk−1 =
(1/(k − 1) + 1/k)(1/2), k = 2, . . . , K.
Chose θ > 0 such that θ/xK < 1/K.
Let
l(x) =

a1 − b1x if x ≤ z1
ak − bkx if zk−1 < x ≤ zk
max
{
aK − bKx, θ/x} if zK−1 ≤ x
Note that l is strictly monotonically decreasing, l > 0, and that l(xk) = 1/k, k =
1, . . . , K.
Let ∆ > 0 be such that
max
{
xk − zk−1, zk − xk} < ∆
for all k.
Let Ψ : R→ R be defined by
Ψ(x) =
Ke
− 1
1−x2 if |x| ≤ ∆
0 if |x| > ∆,
where K is chosen such that
∫
Ψ = 1.
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Let f : R+ → R be defined by
f(x) =
∫
|z|<∆
Ψ(z)l(x− z)dz.
It is easy to see that f is smooth and strictly decreasing.
Note that
f(xk) =
∫
|z|<∆
Ψ(z)(ak − bkxk + bkz)dz
= (1/k)
∫
|z|<∆
Ψ(z)dz + bk
∫
|z|<∆
zΨ(z)dz = 1/k;
where we used the definition of ∆ and that
∫
|z|<∆ zΨ(z)dz = 0.
Step 2: If the data are utilitarian rationalizable, then they are Nash ratio-
nalizable.
Suppose the data are utilitarian rationalizable. We have shown in Step 1 that we
can assume that the rationalizing utility functions are twice continuously differentiable.
Denote by ui the rationalizing utility functions. We now consider the following functions:
uλi (x) = exp(λui(x))
where λ > 0. Consider any compact interval X large enough to contain all data points,
0, and all points
∑
i x
k
i .
Note that (uλi )
′(x) = λu′i(x) exp(λui(x)) and
(uλi )
′′(x) = λu′′i (x) exp(λui(x)) + (λu
′
i(x))
2 exp(λui(x)).
Define
gλi (x) =
(uλi )
′′(x)
(λ exp(λui(x)))
= u′′i (x) + λ(u
′
i(x))
2.
Note that gλi (x) converges monotonically to u
′′
i (x) as λ → 0, so it converges uniformly
(on the compact interval X). Consequently, there exists λ∗ > 0 small for which for all
i ∈ N , gλ∗(x) < 0 for all x ∈ X. Therefore, (uλ∗i )′′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ X and all i ∈ N ,
and clearly, (uλ
∗
i )
′(x) > 0.
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We now extend each uλ
∗
i to all of R arbitrarily, in order to preserve concavity (for
example, we can choose an extension which is affine outside of X).
Then the functions (uλ
∗
i )i∈N Nash-rationalize the data: by construction, the functions
(ui)i∈N utilitarian-rationalize the data, so that the problem max
∑
i ln(u
λ∗
i (yi)) subject
to
∑
i yi =
∑
i x
k
i is solved at (x
k
i )i∈N .
Step 3: The data are comonotonic if and only if they are maxmin ratio-
nalizable
That maxmin rationalizable data are comonotonic is obvious. Conversely, suppose
that we have comonotonic data. By comonotonicity, we may without loss of generality
suppose that x1i < x
2
i < ... < x
K
i for all i (we may remove repeated observations, and
by comonotonicity there are no observations k, l for which for some i, j, xki = x
l
i and
xkj < x
l
j). We construct, for each i, a strictly decreasing positive function fi (potentially
discontinuous), whose integrals will rationalize the data.
We will illustrate a construction of the functions fi by induction. For each i ∈ N , let
gi be any positive, strictly decreasing (affine) function on [0, x
1
i ]. Then for each i ∈ N ,
choose αi > 0 so that
∫ x1i
0
αigi(x)dx =
∫ x1j
0 αjgj(x)dx. Set fi(x) = αigi(x) here.
Let k < K. Assume that fi has been constructed on the interval [0, x
k
i ], and is
positive and strictly decreasing (and that
∫ xl+1i
xli
fi(x)dx =
∫ xl+1j
xlj
fj(x)dx for all l < k and
all i and j). Choose gi again on (x
k
i , x
k+1
i ] so that gi is affine, decreasing and positive.
For all i ∈ N , choose βi > 0 so that
∫ xk+1i
xki
βigi(x)dx =
∫ xk+1j
xkj
βjgj(x)dx, and so that
βigi(x
k
i ) ≤ fi(xki ) for all i ∈ N . Define fi(x) on (xki , xk+1i ] as βigi(x).
Finally, we define, for each i ∈ N , fi on (xki ,∞) so that fi(x) = γx , where γ > 0 is
chosen small enough that fi(x) remains everywhere decreasing.
Now it is enough to define ui(x) =
∫ x
0
fi(x)dx, and note that ui is strictly increasing
and strictly concave. Moreover, by construction, ui maxmin rationalize the data.
While we study three of the most common social welfare functions existing in the
literature, the result can be shown to hold more generally. We conjecture that the result
can be shown to hold for a broad class of social welfare functions which are separable
across agents (both the utilitarian and Nash rules are separable, while maxmin is weakly
separable).
9
3 The classical equal gains model
Let N be a finite set of agents, we may without loss of generality assume it to be finite.
An observation consists of a pair (d, x) ∈ RN × RN . We write observations in the
form (d, x). The pair (d, x) may represent many things; for example, d may represent
a vector of investments and x a vector of returns. Or, d might represent a profile of
post-tax incomes whereas x represents a profile of pre-tax incomes.
A dataset is a finite set of observations D =
{(
dk, xk
)}K
k=1
.
D =
{
(dk, xk) : k = 1, . . . , K
}
.
where (dk, xk) ∈ R2n for all k.
A utility is a strictly increasing function u : R→ R.
A dataset D is rationalized by the utility u : R→ R if, for all k ∈ {1, ..., K} and all
i, j ∈ N ,
u(xki )− u(dki ) = u(xkj )− u(dkj ).
Say that dataset D is rationalizable if there is a utility that rationalizes it.
The notion of rationalization is compatible with the notion of an “equal standard,”
applied to all agents, represented by the utility function u. It is consistent with the
maxmin story, applied to gains in utility. This can be contrasted with Young (1990),
who essentially provides the same model, but under a taxation interpretation.
To begin to understand what rationalizability here entails, let us suppose we
have two agents, so that N = {1, 2}, and that we observe the data points
{((0, 5), (7, 8)), ((1, 2), (3, 8))}. These data correspond to observations ((d1, x1), (d2, x2))
We claim that these data cannot be rationalized. To see why, suppose that u were a
utility function rationalizing these data. This requires that u(5) − u(0) = u(8) − u(7),
and that u(2)− u(1) = u(8)− u(3). Therefore, we must have
[u(7)− u(8)] + [u(8)− u(3)] + [u(5)− u(0)] + [u(1)− u(2)] = 0. (1)
But we can regroup terms in this expression, obtaining the following:
[−u(2) + u(7)] + [−u(8) + u(8)] + [−u(3) + u(5)] + [−u(0) + u(1)] = 0. (2)
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The contradiction arises because in equation (2), each term in brackets is nonnegative,
and there is at least one strictly positive term (in fact, each of the terms [−u(2) + u(7)],
[−u(3)+u(5)], and [−u(0)+u(1)] are strictly positive). Therefore, the terms cannot add
up to zero.
We have shown that data such as these cannot be rationalized. Before we provide the
general condition that data must satisfy to be rationalizable, one more example may help
to understand. Again, let us consider two agents, to keep the analysis simple. Let us sup-
pose we observe the data {((1, 3), (8, 9)), ((2, 5), (8, 9)), ((2, 4), (9, 10)), ((0, 4), (9, 10))}.
Now, again, by appropriately adding and subtracting, we obtain:
([u(1)− u(3)] + [u(5)− u(2)] + [u(2)− u(4)] + [u(4)− u(0)])+
([u(8)− u(8)] + [u(9)− u(10)] + [u(10)− u(9)] + [u(9)− u(8)]) = 0.
But note again, by regrouping, we obtain:
([−u(0) + u(1)] + [−u(3) + u(5)] + [−u(2) + u(2)] + [−u(4) + u(4)])+
([−u(8) + u(8)] + [−u(9) + u(9)] + [−u(10) + u(10)] + [−u(9) + u(9)] = 0.
And again, each of the terms inside of the brackets is nonnegative, and some are strictly
positive. This results in another contradiction.
In each of these two cases, what we have done is the following. We have taken
data points that, if rationalizable, should force a certain expression to add to zero. By
regrouping the terms, the monotonicity of u forces a contradiction, in that the expression
could not possibly add to zero. It turns out that the inability to regroup data in this
sense is necessary and sufficient for the data to be rationalizable. To make sense of this,
we have to be more specific in what we mean by “regrouping data.” It is easiest to think
of this in graph theoretic terms. In equation (1), we can think of edges pointing from 7
to 8, from 8 to 3, from 5 to 0, and from 1 to 2. Note that these edges come in “pairs,”
namely, the edge pointing up from 7 to 8 comes from the data point ((0, 5), (7, 8)), and is
naturally paired with the edge pointing down from 5 to 0. Likewise, the edge pointing up
from 1 to 2 is naturally paired with the edge pointing down from 8 to 3. The interesting
point is that when we put these edges together in the appropriate sequence, they form a
kind of a cycle. That is, consider the “edges” (7, 8), (8, 3), (5, 0), (1, 2). The endpoints of
adjacent edges here are ordered, where we treat (1, 2) and (7, 8) to be adjacent. That is,
the terminal node of edge (7, 8) is less than or equal (in fact, equal) to the first note in
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(8, 3). And so forth, for each pair of adjacent edges. In fact, the terminal node of (8, 3)
is strictly less than the first note in (5, 0), as 3 < 5. And, returning to equation (2), we
see that when we regrouped the data, the term −u(3) + u(5) appeared.
To this end, we define a cycle to be a finite sequence of ordered pairs of real numbers,
{(z1l , z2l )}Ll=1, for which for all l = 1, . . . , L − 1, z2l ≤ z1l+1 and z2L ≤ z11 . A strict cycle
is a cycle {(z1l , z2l )}Ll=1, for which for some l, z2l < z1l+1 or z2L < z11 . A finite sequence
{(z1l , z2l )}Ll=1 defines a (strict) cycle if there exists a bijection σ : L → L for which{(
z1σ(l), z
2
σ(l)
)}L
l=1
is a (strict) cycle.
Then the ordered pairs {(7, 8), (8, 3), (5, 0), (1, 2)} from our first example form a strict
cycle. We could conjecture that for data not to be rationalizable, we should be able
to pair “up” edges with “down” edges in a way that forms a strict cycle. But this
is not quite enough. If we look at the regrouping in the second example, we again
paired up edges with down edges. But we did not end up with a single cycle, in
fact, we ended up with two cycles, only one of which was strict. Namely, the edges
{(1, 3), (5, 2), (2, 4), (4, 0), (8, 9), (9, 10), (10, 9), (9, 8)}do not themselves form a cycle, but
the two sets of edges {(1, 3), (5, 2), (2, 4), (4, 0)}, {(8, 9), (9, 10), (10, 9), (9, 8)} each form
a cycle. Only the first cycle here is strict, but that is all we need.
In general, we can see there is no reason that a sequence of paired edges need corre-
spond to one, two, or even k cycles. All that we need to obtain a contradiction is that
data can be grouped into paired edges which can be partitioned into cycles, at least one
of which is strict. These observations motivate the following definitions.
Let L be a natural number, and let {(al, bl)}Ll=1 and {(a′l, b′l)}Ll=1 be two sequences
of L ordered pairs. Say that {(al, bl)}Ll=1 and {(a′l, b′l)}Ll=1 can be partitioned into cycles
if there exists a natural number T , and for each t ≤ T , a collection of finite sequences
{(z1tl, z2tl)}Ltl=1 which define cycles (at least one cycle of which is strict), for which there
exists a bijection f : {(t, l) : t ≤ T, l ≤ Lt} → {(l, i) : l ≤ L, i = {1, 2}} for which
(z1tl, z
2
tl) = (af1(t,l), bf1(t,l)) if f2(t, l) = 1, and (z
1
tl, z
2
tl) = (a
′
f1(t,l)
, b′f1(t,l)) if f2(t, l) = 2.
The inability to partition paired data points into cycles is exactly the necessary and
sufficient condition needed to guarantee that data are rationalizable.
Proposition 3. The data D =
{
(dk, xk) : k = 1, . . . , K
}
are rationalizable if and only if
there are no sequences of data points (dl, xl)Ll=1 in D, and agents il 6= jl for all l, such
that (
[
dlil , x
l
il
]
)Ll=1 and (
[
xljl , d
l
jl
]
)Ll=1 can be partitioned into cycles, at least one of which
is strict.
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Two points are worth mentioning. The definition of cycle does not preclude repetition
of elements; nor does the notion of “sequence of data points” referred to in the statement
of the Proposition.
Before stating the proof, we point out the following version of the theorem of the
alternative (or Farkas’ Lemma).
Lemma 4. (Integer-Real Farkas) Let {Ai}Ki=1 be a finite collection of vectors in Qn.
Then one and only one of the following statements is true:
i) There exists y ∈ Rn such that for all i = 1, ..., L, Ai · y ≥ 0 and for all i =
L+ 1, ..., K, Ai · y > 0.
ii) There exists z ∈ ZK+ such that
∑K
i=1 ziAi = 0, where
∑K
i=L+1 zi > 0.
Proof. It is clear that both i) and ii) cannot simultaneously hold. We therefore establish
that if ii) does not hold, i) holds. By Theorem 3.2 of Fishburn (1973), if ii) does not hold,
there exists q ∈ Qn such that for all i = 1, ..., L, Ai · q ≥ 0 and for all i = L + 1, ..., K,
Ai · q > 0. Hence, q ∈ Zn.
Proof. Let X ⊆ Rn be a finite set such that dk, xk ∈ X for all k.
There is a rationalizing u if and only if there is a solution to the system of linear
inequalities
((1xki − 1dki ) + (1dkj − 1xkj )) · u ≥ 0 (3)
(1z′ − 1z) · u > 0. (4)
There is an inequality (3) for each i, j and k, and an inequality (4) for each z′, z ∈ X
with z < z′.
Once a solution to the linear inequalities has been obtained, the function u can be
completed by linear interpolation.
By the Lemma 4, there is no solution to system (3)-(4) iff there are vectors λ ∈ ZKN2+
and θ ∈ Z|X|2+ with∑
k,i,j
λk,i,j((1xki − 1dki ) + (1dkj − 1xkj )) +
∑
(z,z′):z′>z
θz,z′(1z′ − 1z) = 0
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and
∑
(z,z′):z′>z θz,z′ > 0.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that dki 6= dkj and xki 6= xkj for all k and all
i 6= j. To see this note that, if dki = dkj then xki < xkj implies that there is no rationalizing
monotonic u; but then the intervals
[
dki , x
k
i
]
and
[
dkj , x
k
j
]
define a strict cycle: 〈dki , xki 〉
〈xkj , dkj 〉. Similarly if xkj < xki . On the other hand, xki = xkj implies that the inequalities
corresponding to k, i, j in (3) are always satisfied. So these inequalities are irrelevant to
the existing of a rationalizing u. The argument is analogous when dki 6= dkj and xki = xkj .
Let the vectors (λk,i,j) and (θz,z′) be as above. Consider the following collections of
vectors in {−1, 0, 1}X : Let AD be the collection of vectors with λk,i,j copies of (1dkj −1xkj );
let AU be the collection with λk,i,j copies of (1xki −1dki ). Let f : AD → AU be the bijection
which associates each (1dkj − 1xkj ) with a different copy of (1xki − 1dki ).
Let AM be the collection with θz,z′ copies of 1z′−1z for each z, z′ ∈ X with z′ > z. By
definition of λ and θ, we know that the sum of the elements of AD, AU , and AM equals
the null vector. We also have that AM 6= ∅.
Let G = (X,E) be the graph obtained by letting there be an edge pointing from
x to x′ iff there is a vector 1x′ − 1x in one of the collections AD, AU or AM . By the
Poincare´-Veblen-Alexander Theorem (see Berge (2001), p. 148, Theorem 5), G can be
partitioned into circuits C1, . . . CT . Note that, if e = (v, v
′) ∈ AU ∪ AM then v ≤ v′. If
e = (v, v′) ∈ AD, then v ≥ v′.
Consider the edges in circuit Ct: Let
[
dlil , x
l
il
]
, l = 1, . . . LUt be the set of intervals
defined by edges (dlil , x
l
il
) ∈ AU and
[
dljl , x
l
jl
]
l = 1, . . . LDt be the set of intervals defined
by edges (xljl , d
l
jl
) ∈ AD. For any edge e = (v, v′) ∈ AU ∪ AD in Ct, let (v′′, v′′′) be the
first edge in Ct after e that is in AU ∪AD. Then either v′ = v′′ or there are edges in AM
between e and (v′′, v′′′) in Ct; so v′ ≤ v′′. Hence, for any e = (v, v′) ∈ AU ∪ AD in Ct,
the successor edge (v′′, v′′′) ∈ AU ∪AD satisfies that v′ ≤ v′′. Hence the intervals (dlil , xlil)
l = 1, . . . LUt and (x
l
jl
, dljl) l = 1, . . . L
D
t define a cycle.
In addition, since AM 6= ∅, at least one of the sets of intervals defined by a circuit Ct
defines a strict cycle.
Finally, since there is a bijection between the edges in AU and in AD, we have that∑
t L
U
t =
∑
t L
D
t = L. So if we let (
[
dlil , x
l
il
]
)Ll=1 collect the sequences
[
dlil , x
l
il
]
, l =
1, . . . LUt , and (
[
xljl , d
l
jl
]
)Ll=1 collect the sequences
[
dljl , x
l
jl
]
l = 1, . . . LDt , then we have a
sequence of intervals in the condition in the statement of the proposition.
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We have here asked for data to be rationalized by a single utility function, common
to all i ∈ N . If, instead, we ask that for each i, there exists ui : R→ R for which for all
i, j ∈ N
ui(x
k
i )− ui(dki ) = uj(xkj )− uj(dkj ),
we obviously get a weaker condition. The weakening required here is simply that when
partitioning data into cycles, each cycle can only contain edges corresponding to a single
agent. The proof is similar to the proceeding and is hence omitted.
3.1 An application to spatial competition
In our version of Hotelling’s model, we observe a finite collection of intervals ([ak, bk]) ⊆
[0, 1], and for each observed interval, a location mk ∈ (ak, bk). We want to know, when
does there exist a full-support distribution µ of agents on [0, 1] such that for each k, mk
is the median of µ conditional on [ak, bk]? This provides us with the testable implications
of the Hotelling model when the distribution of agents is unobserved, but when the
boundaries of spatial competition can vary.
The relation to section 3 is as follows. A distribution µ satisfying the properties
exists if and only if there is a strictly increasing F : [0, 1] → R (a cdf) for which for all
k, F (bk)− F (mk) = F (mk)− F (ak). Now, imagine that in the previous section we had
only two agents (|N | = 2), and dk = (mk, ak), xk = (bk,mk).
This leads us directly to the following corollary:
Corollary 5. A finite list of intervals [ak, bk] and locations mk is consistent with the
Hotelling model if and only if there are no sequences of data points [al, bl]Ll=1, [a
l, bl]L
′
l=L+1
for which {(al,ml)}Ll=1, {(bl,ml)}Ll=1, {(ml, al)}L′l=L+1,{(ml, bl)}L′l=L+1 can be partitioned
into cycles.
4 General results
Section 2 assumed a fixed disagreement point, and claimed that there was little in the way
of testable implications of the Nash (or utilitarian model). Now we turn to an analysis of
these two theories when the disagreement point can vary. We claim that there are clear
testable implications of the Nash model, for example, when the disagreement point can
vary; and in fact, these testable implications come in an easily refutable form. That is,
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a refutation of the model can be provided by demonstrating a solution to a collection
of polynomial inequalities. Our observations will follow immediately from a deep result
in mathematics known as the Positivstellensatz (Stengle (1973)). See in particular
Bochnak, Coste, and Roy (1998) or Marshall (2008).
Before beginning a discussion of the Positivstellensatz, refer back to Lemma 4. Gen-
erally speaking, y is some unknown, and we would like to find whether or not y with the
stated properties exists. The vectors Ai represent vectors which are somehow generated
from observed data. For example, if we observe revealed preference choices, then K may
be the number of observations, and n the number of possible alternatives from which an
agent chooses. Then every observation corresponds to a vector Ai. Say that we observe
object j chosen over object l, then there is an Ai of the form 1i− 1j. The existence of an
y ∈ Rn satisfying the inequalities then translates into the existence of a utility function
rationalizing the data.
The existence of a solution to the prescribed linear inequalities is verifiable: once we
have a solution, we can check that the inequalities are satisfied. The role of Lemma 4
is to demonstrate that existence of a solution is also falsifiable. Together with Eran
Shmaya, we have shown in an earlier work Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010)
(building on the philosophical ideas of Popper and the mathematical ideas of Tarksi),
that falsifiability of a theory is equivalent to a form of universal axiomatizability.3 The
two statements in Lemma 4 are existential, and in this sense verifiable. But what the
theorem says is that if our hypothesized theory is false (that there does not exist y),
then this falsity can be demonstrated, by establishing the existence of z. In other words,
the statement “There exists y ∈ Rn such that for all i = 1, ..., L, Ai · y ≥ 0 and for all
i = L+ 1, ..., K, Ai · y > 0” is equivalent, by Lemma 4, to the universal statement: “For
all z ∈ ZK+ for which
∑K
i=L+1 zi > 0, we have
∑K
i=1 ziAi 6= 0.”
The latter statement is universal, and hence, in a sense falsifiable. The real issue is
that the universal quantifier does not typically operate on observables (here, z is simply
a vector–but in our example, observed data were revealed preference comparisons). It
turns out though, that since z is integer-valued, this universal quantifier can be translated
directly into observables. For example, in the revealed preference example, the fact that
for all for all z ∈ ZK+ for which
∑K
i=L+1 zi > 0, we have
∑K
i=1 ziAi 6= 0 is the same as
saying there are no preference cycles. In general, Lemma 4 allows us to find the exact
3See also Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2011), where we give a general existence results of
universal and effective revealed preference tests. These papers focus on the abstract properties of the
revealed preference exercise, while the present paper is about specific tests for specific economic theories.
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empirical content of many linear models (Scott (1964) is a classic reference). In fact, it is
often the case that one can require the universal quantifier on z to operate over a finite
number of z.
The Positivstellensatz is a related statement for polynomial inequalities. While the
Theorem of the Alternative does not appear to be a direct corollary, the statements are
related. To understand the statement, we need a bit of notation. Given is a collection of
variables, say {x1, ..., xn}. We assume the notion of polynomial is understood. We will
describe one variant of the Positivstellensatz (there are variants corresponding to strict
inequalities as well).
Given a collection of polynomials {f1, ..., fm}, we define the ideal of {f1, ..., fm} to
be the collection of all polynomials which can be written in the form:
m∑
i=1
gifi,
where gi is a polynomial. We define the cone generated by f1, ..., fm to be the smallest
set of polynomials including all sums of squares of polynomials, all polynomials f1, ..., fm,
and which is closed under addition and multiplication. It is easy to see that any such
element can be written as ∑
S⊆{1,...,m}
(
gS
∏
i∈S
fi
)
,
where gS is a sum of squares of polynomials. Finally, we define the multiplicative
monoid generated by f1, ..., fm to be the collection of polynomials of the form
∏m
i=1 f
ai
i ,
where each ai is a nonnegative integer. The following can be found, for example, in
Bochnak, Coste, and Roy (1998), Theorem 4.4.2.
Theorem 6 (Positivstellensatz). A collection of inequalities fi(x) = 0, i = 1, ...,m,
gi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., k, hi(x) 6= 0, i = 1, ..., j is inconsistent if and only if there exist
polynomials f in the ideal of {f1, ..., fm}, g in the cone generated by {g1, ..., gk}, and h
in the multiplicative monoid generated by {h1, ..., hj} for which f + g + h = 0.
The Positivstellensatz thus provides a “dual” system of polynomial inequalities that
must be satisfied for satisfaction of some primal system to be possible. Thus, if a sys-
tem of polynomial inequalities cannot be satisfied, it is possible to demonstrate this.
Practically speaking, however, this may be quite difficult. In an interesting recent field
of research in the mathematics literature, it has been shown that if one is willing only
to search for demonstrations of violations which have bounded degree, then the problem
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becomes much simpler. Indeed, it can be shown to revert to a classical semidefinite pro-
gramming problem. This approach is outlined in Parrilo (2003), a shorter introduction is
provided in Parrilo (2004); see especially Example 1 there. Marshall (2008) Chapter 10
provides a detailed explanation. Thus, there are practical techniques for demonstrating
the infeasibility of given list of polynomial inequalities. However, the fact that there are
no “bounded” degree polynomials solving the dual system of polynomial inequalities does
not prove that the primal list can be satisfied.
It is interesting that, while many economists know and apply the Theorem of the
Alternative, there are almost no applications of the Positivstellensatz (with the notable
exception of the much-overlooked work of Richter (1975), which itself builds on the work
of Tversky (1967)). The theorem is potentially very useful to applied economists, who
would use the algorithms in Parrilo (2004) to carry out tests on actual data sets.
To get a sense of how these ideas might be applied in economics, let us consider an
environment where we observe several bargaining problems: fix N = {1, 2}, and suppose
we observe {(dt, xt)}. We want to know if these data can be rationalized by the Nash
model, in the sense that there exist ui for each i ∈ N , strictly concave and monotonic,
for which xt solves max
∏
i∈N (ui(yi)− ui(dti)) subject to y ≥ dt and
∑
i yi =
∑
i x
t
i. In
fact, it is enough to be able to find numbers ui(x
t
i), u
′
i(x
t
i), ui(d
t
i) such that for all t,
u′1(x
t
1)
(
u2(x
t
2)− u2(dt2)
)
= u′2(x
t
2)
(
u1(x
t
1)− u1(dt1)
)
,
and such that the numbers are consistent with concavity (for example, if xt1 ≤ xt′1 < dt′′1 ,
we require u′1(x
t
1) >
u1(dt
′′
1 )−u1(xt
′
1 )
dt
′′
1 −xt
′
1
). These inequalities are all polynomial (in fact, they
are all quadratic), so in principle, if they cannot be satisfied, then we can find the dual
polynomials in accordance with Theorem 6. Note that, in principle, terms such as dt
′′
1 −xt′1
can be irrational.
The Positivstellensatz is closely related to, but distinct from, the Tarski-Seidenberg
theorem, which has seen few but important applications in economics. Brown and
Matzkin (1996) (see also Brown and Kubler (2008)) exploit this technique to find testable
implications of equilibrium behavior (they also explain how the well-known equivalence
of the strong axiom of revealed preference and rationality is a special case of Tarski-
Seidenberg). Testing whether a system of polynomial inequalities is feasible turns out
to be equivalent to testing whether another (dual) list of polynomial inequalities in the
coefficients is satisfied for the particular choice of coefficients. The canonical example of
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this is that there exists x for which ax2 + bx+ c ≥ 0 if and only if b2 − 4ac ≥ 0.
5 Conclusion
We consider finite sets of observations of bargaining outcomes, and develop the testable
implications of some of the best-known models in bargaining theory.
We consider two basic frameworks. Our results are sharpest for the case where we
assume that disagreement points are fixed across observations. We show that the utilitar-
ian, Nash bargaining, and egalitarian max-min models are all observationally equivalent.
Further, we show that a simple test for these models consists in checking that the observed
allocations are comonotonic.
When disagreement points can vary, we present a characterization of the data that
are consistent with a form of egalitarianism, namely the model of equal gains/losses. The
main application of these results are to tax data, where we can check for consistency of
the tax code with the principle of equal loss when the utility function is unknown but
concave.
Finally, we introduce the Positivstellensatz for testing Nash bargaining and the utili-
tarian model on data with a variable disagreement point. We do not have a “closed form”
test for this case, but the optimization literature has developed useful practical tools that
are readily applicable to testing for consistency of a data set with Nash bargaining, for
example. We hope that one contribution of our paper will be to draw the attention of
economists to these new tools.
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